SPEC-07: Grant-Gated Services, Replaceable Providers, Federated Disclosure, and Extensions
- Version:
1.0.0-draft.2 - Status:
draft(normative rulesdecided; unprofiled standard service types trackedopeninOPEN-QUESTIONS.md) - Evidence / Maturity:
vectors(vectors/trace-01-mail-offline-revoke.json,vectors/trace-04-agent-guardian-intake.json,vectors/refusal-coverage-matrix.json) - Registries:
registry/service-types.json,registry/object-types.json,registry/refusal-codes.json - Schemas:
schemas/manifest.schema.json,schemas/invocation.schema.json
1. Sovereign Provider Model and Mutual Authentication
SealLink decouples user identity from service hosting (email, agent hosts, XMPP, blob storage, wallets, compute) through three normative rules (SL-SERV-001, decided):
- **Pinned Provider Binding (
manifest.providers):** A resource holderid/alicedeclares her active service providers in herseallink-manifest/1(SPEC-03 §3.1) by labeled(service_type, label, provider: NamePin)tuples. Becauseproviderpins(name, registration, owner_policy), an expired and re-registered provider spelling cannot hijack dynamic delegations. - Provider Authority Rule: A participating provider hosting resources for
id/alicerecognizesid/alice(its confirmed ledger name,ScriptPolicy, role keys, and origin/guardian rules) as the sole root of authority overid/alice's hosted resources. The provider MUST serve any caller presenting a validseallink-grant/1issued byid/alice(and verifyingid/alice's confirmed manifest binds this provider's exactNamePinfor(service_type, label), refusingSERVICE_PROVIDER_UNBOUNDotherwise), without requiring the caller to hold a proprietary account at that provider. - Mutual Transport Authentication: Before sending private grants, credentials, or sensitive data to a provider
id/provider, the client resolvesid/provideron its own ledger view, fetchesid/provider's verifiedseallink-manifest/1, and authenticates the endpoint againstservice.tls_spki_sha256(or a verifiedseallink-statement/1withstatement_kind = "transport-binding"andtransport = "https-tls-spki"inid/provider'scertsset) plus verifies signed responses againstservice.receipt_key— never trusting unverified HTTP redirects or peer-claimed provider identities.
2. Replaceable Services and Exclusive Cut-Over (seallink-migration/1)
An actor MUST be able to switch from Provider A (source_executor) to Provider B (dest_executor) of a compatible service_type profile while keeping her id/ identity and without creating duplicate authorized effects or resurrecting spent quotas (SL-SERV-002, decided).
2.1 Portable State Separation
Every service export profile MUST strictly partition three classes of data:
- Holder data (messages, blobs, files, metadata) — portable; holder-side E2EE decryption keys need never be disclosed to either provider.
- Accounting evidence (journal position/commitment, settled usage, outstanding uncertain reservations, signed receipts) — portable for reconciliation, NEVER treated by
dest_executoras unconsumed authority. - Execution credentials (provider wallet keys, upstream API secrets, DKIM keys, active bearer tokens, TLS private keys) — STRICTLY EXCLUDED from export;
dest_executorMUST refuse any export containing execution credentials (SERVICE_MIGRATION_INVALID).
2.2 Four-Step Exclusive Cut-Over (SL-SERV-003, decided)
- Stage: Copy hash-checked holder data to
dest_executorwhilesource_executorremains the sole accounting authority (dest_executoradmits zero effects on imported state). - Fence & Close:
source_executordurably fences new admissions across all replicas, drains in-flight work (retaining every unresolved outcome as boundedoutstanding_exposure), and signsseallink-migration/1(journal_pos,journal_commitment,inventory_sha256,outstanding_exposure) with its pinnedreceiptkey. - Revoke Old Grants & Issue Replacement Grants: Close predecessor concrete-executor grants at
source_executorvia seal spend (a closing receipt alone is NOT revocation). For stateful grants, issue fresh concrete-executor grants namingdest_executorwith reconciled remaining quotas (deducting settled usage AND all uncertain exposure). Updatemanifest.providersin one ledger name update. - Activate: Holder signs
seallink-assent/1(target_type = "seallink-migration/1"; for award, carryingguardian_contextwithevent_class = "custody_change"andguardian_approvals[]perSPEC-04 §3.1);dest_executorcounter-signs acceptance, verifies full hash inventory, persists import atomically (rejecting rollback or conflictingmigration_idwithSERVICE_MIGRATION_INVALID), and enables admissions whilesource_executorremains fenced.
- Unavailable old provider: Operator reconciliation is the default. Never infer unused budget or non-execution from timeouts or silence; keep old uncertain exposure isolated and issue an independent bounded allocation for non-conflicting work.
- Commercial default: Start with small capped prepaid contracts. Unused prepaid credit remains
source_executor's liability and does not transfer automatically by data export.
3. Federated Screening and Progressive PII Disclosure
When two previously unknown actors (or their agents) communicate before establishing mutual trust, SealLink defines a two-phase progressive-disclosure composition (SL-SERV-004, decided):
| Phase | Admission Gate | Data & Tool Boundary | Human / Guardian Gate |
|---|---|---|---|
| Phase 1: Screening | Pinned local trust policy + verified peer identity/members binding + optional seallink-credential/1 (e.g., subject-claim / agent-audit) + bounded screening grant. | Zero PII and zero external mutation tools inside the screening context. Explicit per-peer quotas required (FEDERATION_POLICY_DENIED if missing). | Autonomous within bounded screening quotas. |
| Phase 2: Targeted Disclosure | Fresh unilateral seallink-grant/1 targeting ONE exact recipient and ONE isolated vault executor (e.g., contact-vault or calendar-broker), finite window, dedicated UTXO seal. | Contour A routing: For PII release (e.g., contact/release), the recipient MUST be the partner's personal identity or companion client calling the isolated vault directly — PII MUST NOT transit screening agents or hubs (FEDERATION_POLICY_DENIED). | Explicit L2 / presence-verified approval by the human owner or guardian quorum; the screening agent MUST NEVER self-issue a disclosure grant. |
Neither federation membership nor a verified seallink-credential/1 ever creates grant authority; trust policy may only narrow admission.
4. Extension Rules and SLIP Registration Checklists
Every new Service Profile, Action Leaf, Quota Kind, Contract Profile, or Credential Kind MUST be proposed via a SLIP (SLIP-TEMPLATE.md) or namespaced under reverse-DNS (com.example/<name>) for custom deployments, and MUST explicitly specify (SL-SERV-005, decided):
4.1 Action Leaf and Service Profile Checklist
- Identifier: Exact
service_type(registered inregistry/service-types.jsonor valid reverse-domain) and lowercase slash-separated action leaves (<domain>/<verb>). - Orthogonal Action Properties:
- Cognitive
work(MAY acceptterms_text) vs mechanicaleffect(MUST enforceGRANT_TEXT_FORBIDDEN); external_mutation(true | false);discloses_data(true | false);quota_consuming(true | false);allows_executor_ref(true | false, allowed ONLY whenexternal_mutation = falseandquota_consuming = false);requires_contract,require_seal, and Chain Risk Class (Class 160m vsClass 290m).
- Cognitive
- Closed Target, Arguments, and Result Schemas: Formal Draft 2020-12 JSON Schema (
schemas/profile-<name>.schema.json) forargumentsandresultobjects, target grammar, and permitted Constraint Algebra predicates per argument. - Pagination / Snapshot and Replay Semantics: Exact behavior for multi-page reads, provider switch invalidation, and duplicate
invocation_idretries. - Quota Consumption and Settlement: Consumed quota kinds, reservation formula before effect, actual settlement/release rule, and uncertain-outcome retention rule.
- Receipt and Export Format: Exact
result_sha256payload definition (SHA256(canonical_JCS(result_obj))), mutual transport auth binding, and portable export boundary (§2.1). - Deterministic Refusal Order and Vectors: Complete positive, single-defect negative, and stateful-journal revocation test vectors citing exact
SL-*rule IDs.
4.2 Quota Kind Checklist
Every new quota.kind in registry/constraints.json MUST define: identifier, resource grammar, exact atomic integer unit and scale (zero binary64), min/max bounds, rounding direction (always upward/conservative on reservation), permitted window modes, concurrency/replica sharing, uncertain-outcome retention, denied-request charging (default: refused requests consume zero quota), and paired conformance vectors.
5. Security Considerations
- No wildcard recipients: Services MUST NEVER convert an authenticated login session (
SPEC-03 §5) or federation allowlist into a wildcard grant recipient. - Irreversibility of disclosure: Spending a disclosure seal stops future reads but cannot erase already-disclosed bytes; prefer revocable handles and ephemeral channels over permanent personal identifiers.
- No central verification oracle: Services SHOULD run their own Tier 1 verifier and Namecoin node (
SPEC-02 §1.1) rather than delegating verification to a third-party validation API.
6. References
- Normative: [RFC8785], [BIP-340], [JSON-SCHEMA-2020-12].
- Informative: [RFC8448].