SealLink v1.0.0-draft.2

SPEC-07: Grant-Gated Services, Replaceable Providers, Federated Disclosure, and Extensions

  • Version: 1.0.0-draft.2
  • Status: draft (normative rules decided; unprofiled standard service types tracked open in OPEN-QUESTIONS.md)
  • Evidence / Maturity: vectors (vectors/trace-01-mail-offline-revoke.json, vectors/trace-04-agent-guardian-intake.json, vectors/refusal-coverage-matrix.json)
  • Registries: registry/service-types.json, registry/object-types.json, registry/refusal-codes.json
  • Schemas: schemas/manifest.schema.json, schemas/invocation.schema.json

1. Sovereign Provider Model and Mutual Authentication

SealLink decouples user identity from service hosting (email, agent hosts, XMPP, blob storage, wallets, compute) through three normative rules (SL-SERV-001, decided):

  1. **Pinned Provider Binding (manifest.providers):** A resource holder id/alice declares her active service providers in her seallink-manifest/1 (SPEC-03 §3.1) by labeled (service_type, label, provider: NamePin) tuples. Because provider pins (name, registration, owner_policy), an expired and re-registered provider spelling cannot hijack dynamic delegations.
  2. Provider Authority Rule: A participating provider hosting resources for id/alice recognizes id/alice (its confirmed ledger name, ScriptPolicy, role keys, and origin/guardian rules) as the sole root of authority over id/alice's hosted resources. The provider MUST serve any caller presenting a valid seallink-grant/1 issued by id/alice (and verifying id/alice's confirmed manifest binds this provider's exact NamePin for (service_type, label), refusing SERVICE_PROVIDER_UNBOUND otherwise), without requiring the caller to hold a proprietary account at that provider.
  3. Mutual Transport Authentication: Before sending private grants, credentials, or sensitive data to a provider id/provider, the client resolves id/provider on its own ledger view, fetches id/provider's verified seallink-manifest/1, and authenticates the endpoint against service.tls_spki_sha256 (or a verified seallink-statement/1 with statement_kind = "transport-binding" and transport = "https-tls-spki" in id/provider's certs set) plus verifies signed responses against service.receipt_key — never trusting unverified HTTP redirects or peer-claimed provider identities.

An actor MUST be able to switch from Provider A (source_executor) to Provider B (dest_executor) of a compatible service_type profile while keeping her id/ identity and without creating duplicate authorized effects or resurrecting spent quotas (SL-SERV-002, decided).

2.1 Portable State Separation

Every service export profile MUST strictly partition three classes of data:

  1. Holder data (messages, blobs, files, metadata) — portable; holder-side E2EE decryption keys need never be disclosed to either provider.
  2. Accounting evidence (journal position/commitment, settled usage, outstanding uncertain reservations, signed receipts) — portable for reconciliation, NEVER treated by dest_executor as unconsumed authority.
  3. Execution credentials (provider wallet keys, upstream API secrets, DKIM keys, active bearer tokens, TLS private keys) — STRICTLY EXCLUDED from export; dest_executor MUST refuse any export containing execution credentials (SERVICE_MIGRATION_INVALID).

2.2 Four-Step Exclusive Cut-Over (SL-SERV-003, decided)

  1. Stage: Copy hash-checked holder data to dest_executor while source_executor remains the sole accounting authority (dest_executor admits zero effects on imported state).
  2. Fence & Close: source_executor durably fences new admissions across all replicas, drains in-flight work (retaining every unresolved outcome as bounded outstanding_exposure), and signs seallink-migration/1 (journal_pos, journal_commitment, inventory_sha256, outstanding_exposure) with its pinned receipt key.
  3. Revoke Old Grants & Issue Replacement Grants: Close predecessor concrete-executor grants at source_executor via seal spend (a closing receipt alone is NOT revocation). For stateful grants, issue fresh concrete-executor grants naming dest_executor with reconciled remaining quotas (deducting settled usage AND all uncertain exposure). Update manifest.providers in one ledger name update.
  4. Activate: Holder signs seallink-assent/1 (target_type = "seallink-migration/1"; for a ward, carrying guardian_context with event_class = "custody_change" and guardian_approvals[] per SPEC-04 §3.1); dest_executor counter-signs acceptance, verifies full hash inventory, persists import atomically (rejecting rollback or conflicting migration_id with SERVICE_MIGRATION_INVALID), and enables admissions while source_executor remains fenced.
  • Unavailable old provider: Operator reconciliation is the default. Never infer unused budget or non-execution from timeouts or silence; keep old uncertain exposure isolated and issue an independent bounded allocation for non-conflicting work.
  • Commercial default: Start with small capped prepaid contracts. Unused prepaid credit remains source_executor's liability and does not transfer automatically by data export.

3. Federated Screening and Progressive PII Disclosure

When two previously unknown actors (or their agents) communicate before establishing mutual trust, SealLink defines a two-phase progressive-disclosure composition (SL-SERV-004, decided):

PhaseAdmission GateData & Tool BoundaryHuman / Guardian Gate
Phase 1: ScreeningPinned local trust policy + verified peer identity/members binding + optional seallink-credential/1 (e.g., subject-claim / agent-audit) + bounded screening grant.Zero PII and zero external mutation tools inside the screening context. Explicit per-peer quotas required (FEDERATION_POLICY_DENIED if missing).Autonomous within bounded screening quotas.
Phase 2: Targeted DisclosureFresh unilateral seallink-grant/1 targeting ONE exact recipient and ONE isolated vault executor (e.g., contact-vault or calendar-broker), finite window, dedicated UTXO seal.Contour A routing: For PII release (e.g., contact/release), the recipient MUST be the partner's personal identity or companion client calling the isolated vault directly — PII MUST NOT transit screening agents or hubs (FEDERATION_POLICY_DENIED).Explicit L2 / presence-verified approval by the human owner or guardian quorum; the screening agent MUST NEVER self-issue a disclosure grant.

Neither federation membership nor a verified seallink-credential/1 ever creates grant authority; trust policy may only narrow admission.


4. Extension Rules and SLIP Registration Checklists

Every new Service Profile, Action Leaf, Quota Kind, Contract Profile, or Credential Kind MUST be proposed via a SLIP (SLIP-TEMPLATE.md) or namespaced under reverse-DNS (com.example/<name>) for custom deployments, and MUST explicitly specify (SL-SERV-005, decided):

4.1 Action Leaf and Service Profile Checklist

  1. Identifier: Exact service_type (registered in registry/service-types.json or valid reverse-domain) and lowercase slash-separated action leaves (<domain>/<verb>).
  2. Orthogonal Action Properties:
    • Cognitive work (MAY accept terms_text) vs mechanical effect (MUST enforce GRANT_TEXT_FORBIDDEN);
    • external_mutation (true | false);
    • discloses_data (true | false);
    • quota_consuming (true | false);
    • allows_executor_ref (true | false, allowed ONLY when external_mutation = false and quota_consuming = false);
    • requires_contract, require_seal, and Chain Risk Class (Class 1 60m vs Class 2 90m).
  3. Closed Target, Arguments, and Result Schemas: Formal Draft 2020-12 JSON Schema (schemas/profile-<name>.schema.json) for arguments and result objects, target grammar, and permitted Constraint Algebra predicates per argument.
  4. Pagination / Snapshot and Replay Semantics: Exact behavior for multi-page reads, provider switch invalidation, and duplicate invocation_id retries.
  5. Quota Consumption and Settlement: Consumed quota kinds, reservation formula before effect, actual settlement/release rule, and uncertain-outcome retention rule.
  6. Receipt and Export Format: Exact result_sha256 payload definition (SHA256(canonical_JCS(result_obj))), mutual transport auth binding, and portable export boundary (§2.1).
  7. Deterministic Refusal Order and Vectors: Complete positive, single-defect negative, and stateful-journal revocation test vectors citing exact SL-* rule IDs.

4.2 Quota Kind Checklist

Every new quota.kind in registry/constraints.json MUST define: identifier, resource grammar, exact atomic integer unit and scale (zero binary64), min/max bounds, rounding direction (always upward/conservative on reservation), permitted window modes, concurrency/replica sharing, uncertain-outcome retention, denied-request charging (default: refused requests consume zero quota), and paired conformance vectors.


5. Security Considerations

  • No wildcard recipients: Services MUST NEVER convert an authenticated login session (SPEC-03 §5) or federation allowlist into a wildcard grant recipient.
  • Irreversibility of disclosure: Spending a disclosure seal stops future reads but cannot erase already-disclosed bytes; prefer revocable handles and ephemeral channels over permanent personal identifiers.
  • No central verification oracle: Services SHOULD run their own Tier 1 verifier and Namecoin node (SPEC-02 §1.1) rather than delegating verification to a third-party validation API.

6. References

  • Normative: [RFC8785], [BIP-340], [JSON-SCHEMA-2020-12].
  • Informative: [RFC8448].