SPEC-06: Universal Grants, Invocations, Re-Delegation, Sessions, and Anti-Rollback Journals
- Version:
1.0.0-draft.2 - Status:
draft(normative rulesdecided; external CAS witness transport protocol trackedopeninOPEN-QUESTIONS.md) - Evidence / Maturity:
vectors(vectors/trace-01-mail-offline-revoke.json,vectors/trace-03-delegation-pool-single-use.json,vectors/trace-04-agent-guardian-intake.json,vectors/refusal-coverage-matrix.json) - Registries:
registry/object-types.json,registry/constraints.json,registry/opreturn-actions.json,registry/refusal-codes.json - Schemas:
schemas/grant.schema.json,schemas/invocation.schema.json
1. Universal Grant Model (seallink-grant/1)
A seallink-grant/1 (<= 65536 bytes, schemas/grant.schema.json) is the universal authorization instrument across people, organizations, services, and agents (SL-GRNT-001, decided). Every grant carries exactly one of issuer (root grant) or parent (depth-2 child grant).
1.1 Unilateral Base and Optional Contract Binding
- Unilateral base: An autonomous root grant requires ONLY the issuer's valid
SignatureSetmatchingissuer.role_policy(pinned on chain inlink.grantperSL-IDEN-003). A root grant issued on behalf of awardomitsissuer.role_policy, setspayload.guardian_context, and carries top-levelguardian_approvals[]satisfyingrequired(derived_event_class)(SL-WIRE-013,SL-ORIG-006). Neither form requires recipient assent or imposes obligations on the recipient. - Contract-bound grants: Setting optional
contract_idbinds the grant to aseallink-contract/1(SPEC-05): the grant's window MUST nest inside the contract (and any framework contract), allmachine_clause_indicesMUST be disclosed and match the grant's capabilities, and spending the contract or framework seal terminates the grant (SEAL_SPENT). Action profiles withrequires_contract = truerefuse unilateral grants (GRANT_CONTRACT_REQUIRED).
1.2 Recipient Modes (SL-GRNT-002, decided)
Every grant selects exactly one recipient mode:
- **By Key (
mode = "key"):** Names onexonly_64hexpublic key (suitable for ephemeral key-only workers and hardware keys). Ledger name resolution is skipped for the recipient. - **By Name (
mode = "name"):** Names(name, owner_policy). At invocation, the verifier resolvesname, confirms its current live output matchesowner_policy(NAME_OWNER_MISMATCH), and accepts signatures from the name's current authorizednostr/request key, permitting same-owner key rotation and name renewal without reissuing the grant. - **By Group (
mode = "group"):** Names aThresholdPolicy(m-of-ndistinct keys), authorizing execution ONLY when>= mdistinct co-recipients signseallink-invocation/1(SignatureSet).
1.3 Concrete executor vs. Stateless executor_ref (SL-GRNT-003, decided)
Every action leaf in a service profile declares four orthogonal boolean properties (SPEC-07 §4.1): external_mutation, discloses_data, quota_consuming, and allows_executor_ref. Every grant carries exactly one of:
- **Concrete
executor: {name, key}: Pins one specific service identity and receipt key. MANDATORY** whenever ANY capability incapabilities[]hasexternal_mutation = true,quota_consuming = true, carriesquotas, usessingle_userevocation, or includesdelegate. - **Dynamic
executor_ref: {provider_of, service_type, label}:** Resolves at verification time againstprovider_of's current confirmedseallink-manifest/1providers[]entry (NamePin+ service manifestreceipt_key) matching(service_type, label). STRICTLY FORBIDDEN if the grant carries anyquotas, usessingle_userevocation, includesdelegate, or includes any action withexternal_mutation = trueorallows_executor_ref = false(GRANT_EXECUTOR_REF_FORBIDDEN).
Rationale: Stateless data-read actions (e.g.,
mail/readwithout quotas) havediscloses_data = trueandexternal_mutation = false, so resolving the current pinned provider viaexecutor_refcannot double-spend quotas or cause duplicate side effects.
1.4 Validity Window and Revocation Modes (SL-GRNT-004, decided)
- Half-open block window:
[not_before_height, not_after_height)withrecent_block_height <= not_before_height < not_after_heightandnot_after_height <= issuer_name_expiry_at_issuancefor sealed grants. Admission attip == not_after_heightrefusesGRANT_WINDOW_CLOSED. Optionalmin_depth(1..144, defaults to1) specifies the issuer's minimum required anchor/seal confirmation depth. - Two revocation modes:
- **
revocation.mode = "seal"(Standard Default):** Namesconstruction ("W" | "L"),kind ("revocable" | "single_use"), and confirmedseal: {txid, vout, script_policy}. Anchored viaOP_RETURN 0x01(or Merkle batch0x02withMerkleProof) committingtyped_digest(seallink-issuance/1)(loc = 0x00default). Spending arevocableseal closes the grant at mempool speed (SEAL_SPENT). Asingle_useseal MUST useScriptPolicytemplatesingle_use_1_of_2and follows the branch-aware state machine inSPEC-02 §6.2. - **
revocation.mode = "window_only"(Root-Only Zero-Tx Ephemeral Mode): Strictly permitted ONLY on root** grants withoutdelegate(parentanddelegateMUST be absent), withnot_after_height - not_before_height <= 12blocks. Requires zero ledger transactions. **Executors MUST refusewindow_onlyby default (GRANT_SEAL_REQUIRED)** unless local executor policy explicitly opts in for that action and budget tier. Emergency rotation/removal of the issuer'slink.grant(NAME_ROLE_CHANGED) still terminates all livewindow_onlygrants immediately.
- **
1.5 Text-vs-Effect Invariant (SL-GRNT-005, decided)
A grant MAY carry optional terms_text solely to guide cognitive work (e.g., agent/brief). Any mechanical effect executor (mail/*, agent/tool, agent/session, wallets, locks, name updaters, blob stores) MUST refuse any grant containing terms_text (GRANT_TEXT_FORBIDDEN).
2. Invocations (seallink-invocation/1) and Signed Receipts (seallink-receipt/1)
2.1 Signed Invocation and Acyclic Single-Use Delivery (SL-GRNT-006, decided)
Every execution request is a canonical JCS seallink-invocation/1 (<= 1 MiB) signed by the final grant's recipient (SignatureSet):
- Binds
network,genesis, concreteexecutor {name, key}, exactaction,target, closed typedarguments(validated against the owning profile schema), optionalcontent_salt(SPEC-05 §3),proof_path(1 entry for root grant, 2 entries[parent, child]for delegated child grant, each optionally carryingissuance_txidandbatch_proof), 32-byte CSPRNGnonce, and wall-clock half-open window[iat, exp)(iat <= now < exp, no grace,INVOKE_TIME_INVALID). - **Acyclic single-use consumption (
0x11):**seallink-invocation/1NEVER embedsuse_txid. For asingle_usegrant:- The grantee constructs and signs
seallink-invocation/1, computinginvocation_content_addr = SHA256(canonical_JCS(invocation)). - The grantee broadcasts
T_usespending thesingle_use_1_of_2seal via branch0(grantee,SIGHASH_ALL) withOP_RETURN 0x11(SINGLE_USE_CONSUMPTION) committinginvocation_content_addr. - The grantee delivers
(seallink-invocation/1, use_txid = txid(T_use))in the transport envelope alongside inline grant/contract/manifest bytes. The executor verifiesT_useon its own chain view (SPEC-02 §6.2).
- The grantee constructs and signs
- Signed arguments are sole authority: The executor MUST derive effect parameters strictly from
payload.arguments(never from transport headers or unsigned wrapper fields) and evaluate everywherepredicate (SL-WIRE-016) againstpayload.arguments(INVOKE_CONSTRAINT_FAILED).
2.2 Quota Accounting, Reservation, and Settlement (SL-GRNT-007, decided)
- Reserve before effect: Before executing any effect, the executor MUST atomically reserve the maximum possible debit for every quota key consumed by the action in its fenced journal (
§6): the grant'sownaccount (and for a child grant, the parent'srowaccount — never the parent'sownaccount) plus operator ceilings (QUOTA_EXCEEDED). A zero ceiling authorizes nothing; missing required quota refuses. - Window modes:
term: cumulative across[not_before_height, not_after_height).blocks:<N>: half-open block buckets[not_before_height + k*N, not_before_height + (k+1)*N).seconds:<S>: UTC epoch-aligned buckets[floor(now/S)*S, (floor(now/S)+1)*S)guarded by a durable per-key monotonic clock watermark (QUOTA_CLOCK_REGRESSION).
- Settlement (Actual Charge and Release): Once an effect completes with a known actual debit, the executor charges the exact actual debit (exact integer/rational arithmetic rounded upward once per request, zero binary64) and releases the unused reservation difference (
reserved = settled + released). - Uncertain outcomes: If an effect outcome is uncertain (timeout, crash, network split), the full reservation MUST be retained until operator/protocol reconciliation; the executor reports
outcome = "uncertain"and MUST NOT silently refund or allow replay. - Idempotency and Replay: Request identity is
invocation_id = SHA256(canonical_JCS(invocation.payload))(excludingsignatures). A repeated identicalinvocation_idMUST perform no second effect; the executor returns its stored signed receipt or refusesINVOKE_REPLAYper profile. A reusednoncewith a different payload MUST refuseINVOKE_REPLAY.
2.3 Signed Receipt (SL-GRNT-008, decided)
Every executor answers with a seallink-receipt/1 signed by its pinned receipt key (executor.key), recording invocation_id, grant_id, action, outcome ("executed" | "refused" | "uncertain"), optional refusal_code, settlements[], optional result_sha256, and observation (tip_height, tip_hash, recorded_at). Callers MUST verify receipts solely against their pinned executor.key.
3. Bounded Depth-2 Re-Delegation
A root seallink-grant/1 MAY authorize bounded child grants by including delegate (SL-GRNT-009, decided). Maximum authority path depth is 2 (root -> child; children MUST NOT carry delegate and MUST use revocation.mode = "seal" bound to delegate.child_seal_key, GRANT_NOT_DELEGABLE).
- Separated delegation and child-seal keys:
delegate.key(xonly_64hex) signs child grants ONLY (disjoint from issuer, recipient, and messaging keys; held in an isolated delegation signing service enforcing at-most-one signature per row,guides/GUIDE-01-custody-and-signers.md).delegate.child_seal_key(compressed_66hex) controls the issuer revocation branch of every child grant's seal (held outside the delegation signer so the delegator can revoke children even if the delegation signer is compromised).
- **Grouped rows, row coins, and pairwise disjointness (
R8.6):**delegate.groupsholds1..16groups; each group pairs atemplate(concreteexecutor, closedrecipient_rule(exact_key | exact_name | member_class),capabilities[], andnotary_mode) with1..16rangesof1..4096pre-confirmed P2WPKH row coins (confirmed<= parent.recent_block).- **Disjoint coin ranges (
R8.6):** Every(txid, vout)across ALL row ranges and ALL stop-coin ranges across ALL groups indelegate.groups, as well as the parent's ownsealand linkage output, MUST be pairwise disjoint (GRANT_ROW_INVALID). - Global 1-based
ordinalenumerates rows in signed group/range order. A child namingparent: {grant_id, ordinal}MUST have its issuance anchor (0x01or0x02) spend the exact row coin forordinal(GRANT_ROW_INVALID), enforcing on chain that at most one child per row exists.
- **Whole-parent aggregate budget (
R8.5) and mechanical child narrowing (SL-GRNT-010,decided):** Every verifier MUST check BOTH the whole parent allocation AND the individual child:- **Whole-parent budget sum (
R8.5):** For every quota keyq = (kind, resource, unit, window)appearing in any group template'scapabilities[].quotas, letrows(g) = sum(r.count for r in g.ranges)andcap(g, q)be the maximum ceiling forqin groupg's template (summed across capabilities ingthat shareq). Using exact integer arithmetic (overflow ->GRANT_CHILD_WIDER), the verifier MUST confirm a matching pool entrypool_max(q)exists indelegate.poolsand:
- **Whole-parent budget sum (
sum over all groups g of (rows(g) * cap(g, q)) <= pool_max(q)
Failure refuses GRANT_CHILD_WIDER. (This invariant prevents sibling rows at different executors from exceeding the parent's total budget.)
- Child-within-parent check:
C.genesis == P.genesis,C.contract_id == P.contract_id(if present),C.executor == template.executor, andC.revocation.mode == "seal"with issuer branch controlled byP.delegate.child_seal_key;[C.not_before_height, C.not_after_height) ⊆ [P.not_before_height, P.not_after_height);- Every capability in
C.capabilitiesmechanically narrows a capability intemplate.capabilitiesunder the 7-predicate Constraint Algebra (SL-WIRE-017), and every child quota<=the template's row cap; C.recipientsatisfiestemplate.recipient_rule(exact_keymatchesmode="key";exact_namematchesmode="name"with equalnameandowner_policy;member_classchecks live unspent membership ofC.recipientin at least one pinned operator's confirmedseallink-members-list/1).
- **Optional notary and stop coins (
SL-GRNT-011,decided):**"none"(default): mechanical narrowing underSL-GRNT-010requires no notary."optional_stop": range specifies confirmed P2WPKH stop coins controlled by a pinned notary; spending a stop coin permanently closes that row for cause across all verifiers (GRANT_ROW_STOPPED)."required_act": additionally requires a verifiedseallink-notary/1(act_kind = "child-within-parent") act (NOTARY_REQUIRED).
4. Deterministic Admission Order (Invocation Pipeline)
An executor MUST evaluate an incoming seallink-invocation/1 in this exact 12-step order, returning the first failure (SL-GRNT-012, decided). Early recipient authentication runs strictly before cached-receipt lookup and blockchain RPCs to prevent unauthenticated DoS, cached-receipt harvesting, and state-oracle leakage:
- **Invocation wire check (
SPEC-01 §7):** Parse and verifyseallink-invocation/1syntax, JCS, closed schema, profile argument schema, keys, and self-consistentSignatureSet->WIRE_* - Early local request checks (pre-chain):
- 2a. Wall-clock half-open window
iat <= now < exp->INVOKE_TIME_INVALID - 2b.
invocation.executorequals this executor's pinned(name, receipt_key)->GRANT_EXECUTOR_MISMATCH
- 2a. Wall-clock half-open window
- Presented bundle wire, early recipient authentication, and replay check (pre-chain):
- 3a. Wire pipeline on presented grant(s), optional contract(s), and optional manifest(s) ->
WIRE_* - 3b. If leaf grant uses
recipient.mode = "key"or"group", verifyinvocation.signatures.policyequalsgrant.recipientimmediately ->WIRE_SIGNATURE(runs before any cached-receipt lookup so forged callers cannot probe or retrieve cached receipts) - 3c. For
keyandgrouprecipients (whose authentication succeeded in Step 3b): check local journal replay/nonce table. Ifinvocation_idalready has a stored terminal receipt, return that cached receipt (orINVOKE_REPLAYif profile forbids cached return). Ifinvocation_idhas an unsettledreservation(crash inside the external-effect window before receipt persistence), returnoutcome = "uncertain"while retaining the reservation and executing zero second effect. Ifnoncewas already used for a differentinvocation_id, refuseINVOKE_REPLAY. *(Forrecipient.mode = "name", this identical replay/crash-recovery check runs immediately after Step 11a once the recipient's on-chain key is verified.)*
- 3a. Wire pipeline on presented grant(s), optional contract(s), and optional manifest(s) ->
- **Consistent chain observation (
SPEC-02 §4):** Check in strict order:- 4a. Chain/genesis pin ->
CHAIN_MISMATCH - 4b. Reading node health (
!IBD,txindex=1, header lag<= LAG) ->CHAIN_UNHEALTHY - 4c. Independent comparison peer veto ->
CHAIN_NODE_DISAGREEMENT - 4d. Monotonic UTC clock watermark and header future bound
S->CHAIN_CLOCK_ERROR - 4e. Action risk-class tip freshness (
tip_age) ->CHAIN_TIP_STALE
- 4a. Chain/genesis pin ->
- **Journal continuity (
§6):** Check external CAS witness readability, local store readability, andjournal_idmatch (JOURNAL_LOST), then activewrite_token(JOURNAL_FENCED), then position/commitment continuity (JOURNAL_LOST) - Durable closure check: Check local closure journal for every grant ID, contract ID, framework ID, issuer role, and row in
proof_path, in strict order:- 6a. Closed grant or ancestor grant ->
INVOKE_REPLAYif closed specifically bySINGLE_USE_CONSUMED(for a newinvocation_id), elseGRANT_CLOSED - 6b. Stopped row ->
GRANT_ROW_STOPPED - 6c. Closed issuer role ->
NAME_ROLE_CHANGED - 6d. Closed seal ->
SEAL_SPENT
- 6a. Closed grant or ancestor grant ->
- **Issuer identity, origin, and guardianship (
SPEC-03,SPEC-04):**- 7a. Resolve root issuer name (
NAME_NOT_FOUND), liveness (NAME_EXPIRED), history walk availability (NAME_HISTORY_UNAVAILABLE),SIGHASH_ALLwriter check (NAME_WRITER_UNVERIFIED),owner_policymatch (NAME_OWNER_MISMATCH), 520B name value grammar (NAME_VALUE_INVALID). For autonomous issuers (no verified ward origin): verifylink.grantcontinuity (NAME_ROLE_CHANGED), verifyissuer.role_policymatcheslink.grantand equalsroot_grant.signatures.policy(WIRE_SIGNATURE). - 7b. If origin-certified (
link.originor pinned origin): check in strict order:origin/1validity & trust (ORIGIN_UNVERIFIED),name-binding/1validity (ORIGIN_BINDING_INVALID),status_sealandroster_sealcompleteness (ORIGIN_STATUS_INCOMPLETE), subject end (SUBJECT_ENDED), pending emancipation transfer (GUARDIAN_TRANSFER_PENDING), calendar majority time boundary (GUARDIAN_TIME_BOUNDARY); ifward, enforceSL-ORIG-006order (WARD_AUTONOMOUS_FORBIDDEN, thenGUARDIAN_INACTIVE, thenWIRE_SIGNATURE, thenGUARDIAN_QUORUM_UNMET).
- 7a. Resolve root issuer name (
- **Contract and framework checks (
SPEC-05):** Check in strict order: action requires contract (GRANT_CONTRACT_REQUIRED); ifcontract_idpresent: presentation (CONTRACT_NOT_PRESENTED), ID recomputation (CONTRACT_ID_MISMATCH), party assents (CONTRACT_ASSENT_INVALID), confirmed seal presence &ScriptPolicymatch (CONTRACT_SEAL_MISSING), seal spend (SEAL_SPENT) or inconclusive seal (SEAL_UNAVAILABLE), disclosedmachine_clause_indices& window nesting (CONTRACT_TERMS_MISMATCH), runtimeconfig_sha256if required (CONTRACT_CONFIG_MISMATCH). - **Re-delegation checks (depth 2,
§3):** Check in strict order: parent delegation rights & depth<= 2(GRANT_NOT_DELEGABLE), whole-parent R8.5 aggregate pool sum (GRANT_CHILD_WIDER), R8.6 disjointness & ordinal row coin spend (GRANT_ROW_INVALID), stop coin live (GRANT_ROW_STOPPED), optional notary act (NOTARY_REQUIRED), childsignatures.policyequalsparent.delegate.key(WIRE_SIGNATURE), mechanical child narrowing against group template (GRANT_CHILD_WIDER). - Grant window, revocation / single-use seal, and executor binding:
- 10a. Grant height window
[not_before_height, not_after_height)->GRANT_WINDOW_CLOSED - 10b. If
revocation.mode = "window_only": enforcenot_after_height - not_before_height <= 12(WIRE_INTEGER), then executor opt-in policy (GRANT_SEAL_REQUIRED) - 10c. If
revocation.mode = "seal": verify issuance0x01/0x02frame & Merkle proof (CHAIN_FRAME_INVALID),recent_blockrecency (CHAIN_RECENCY_INVALID), WitnessWconstruction (CHAIN_TX_CONSTRUCTION), anchor depth (CHAIN_DEPTH_INSUFFICIENT); then evaluate seal: revocable(SPEC-02 §6.1):revoked-> write closure +SEAL_SPENT;unavailable->SEAL_UNAVAILABLEsingle_use(SPEC-02 §6.2):awaiting_spend->SEAL_UNAVAILABLE;revoked-> write closure +SEAL_SPENT;pending_confirm->CHAIN_DEPTH_INSUFFICIENT;consumedwith distinctinvocation_id->INVOKE_REPLAY- 10d. Verify
executoror resolveexecutor_ref: forbidexecutor_refon stateful/mutating/single-use/delegating grants (GRANT_EXECUTOR_REF_FORBIDDEN); verify holder's confirmed manifest (MANIFEST_UNAVAILABLE, thenMANIFEST_MISMATCH, thenMANIFEST_ROLLBACK), confirm providerNamePinbinding (SERVICE_PROVIDER_UNBOUND) and providerowner_policy(NAME_OWNER_MISMATCH), confirm resolved(name, receipt_key)matches this executor (GRANT_EXECUTOR_MISMATCH)
- 10a. Grant height window
- Named recipient, action, text ban, and constraints:
- 11a. If leaf grant uses
recipient.mode = "name", resolve recipient name (NAME_NOT_FOUND), check liveness (NAME_EXPIRED), checkowner_policy(NAME_OWNER_MISMATCH), verifyinvocation.signatures.policyagainst its authorized request key (WIRE_SIGNATURE), and then execute the Step 3c local journal replay / crash-recovery check (INVOKE_REPLAY, cached receipt, oruncertain) - 11b. Action supported and present in
grant.capabilities(INVOKE_ACTION_DENIED) - 11c. Mechanical effect text ban (
GRANT_TEXT_FORBIDDEN) - 11d. Target match and 7-predicate
whereevaluation againstinvocation.arguments(INVOKE_CONSTRAINT_FAILED)
- 11a. If leaf grant uses
- Pre-effect recheck and atomic reservation: Re-bracket chain tip (
CHAIN_OBSERVATION_VOID, thenCHAIN_TIP_STALE) and re-check live seals (SEAL_SPENT), verify seconds-window monotonic clock (QUOTA_CLOCK_REGRESSION), atomically writenonce+reservationentries to fenced journal (QUOTA_EXCEEDED, thenJOURNAL_FENCED, thenJOURNAL_LOST)
5. Bearer Sessions for Non-Signing Clients (seallink-session-open/1)
When a client harness cannot sign per-request invocations (e.g., an SDK accepting only a base URL and bearer token), an executor MAY support short-lived sessions (SL-GRNT-013, decided):
- Recipient's key holder sends a signed
seallink-session-open/1(<= 16384bytes,op = "open" | "extend" | "close") withslot_binding, boundedquotas <= grant.quotas, andexp <= now + 3600(at most 1 hour ahead). - Executor runs the full admission pipeline (
§4), binds a 32-byte CSPRNG bearer token (storing ONLYSHA256(token)in its journal), and returns the token once over a local socket or mutually authenticated encrypted channel. - Every unsigned in-session request MUST re-run live chain observation, seal checks, and recipient channel-key checks before reserving from
(grant, row, session)accounts (SESSION_INVALIDon mismatch, expiry, or any link closure). - Unsigned in-session requests lack per-request non-repudiation and retry idempotency; executors MUST NOT enable bearer sessions for wallets, name updates, or irreversible financial transfers.
6. Anti-Rollback Fenced Journals (seallink-journal-entry/1)
Every stateful SealLink verifier/executor (tracking closures, single-use consumption, quota reservations, nonces, and manifest heads) MUST guard against backup-restore and equal-position forks using a hash-chained journal + external CAS witness (SL-GRNT-014, decided state machine / open witness wire transport in OPEN-QUESTIONS.md):
- Hash chain: Random 32-byte
journal_id; commitmentc(0) = H_tag("seallink-journal/1", journal_id),c(n) = H_tag("seallink-journal/1", c(n-1) || canonical_JCS(entry_n)). Everyentry_nMUST validate against the closed discriminatedJournalEntryschema (schemas/invocation.schema.json) withentry_n.pos == nandentry_n.prev_commitment == c(n-1). - External witness: An append-only CAS register stored strictly outside the local store's backup domain, holding
(journal_id, pos, commitment, write_token). Onlyadvance(journal_id, token, pos, from_commit, to_commit)mutates it; fencing strictly incrementswrite_token. - Write order: Check continuity -> durably write local entry ->
advanceexternal witness -> execute effect. - Continuity precedence: (1) witness readable, (2) local store readable, (3) matching
journal_id-> elseJOURNAL_LOST; (4) activewrite_tokenheld -> elseJOURNAL_FENCED(checked before position comparison so partitioned replicas fence cleanly); (5)store.pos == witness.posand equal commitment (Intact), orstore.pos == witness.pos + 1with matchingprev_commitment(Pendingcompletion), elseJOURNAL_LOST. - Attended recovery (start anew): Record
recoveryentry withfenced_at, wait for a confirmed ledger blockboundarywhoseheader_time > fenced_at + 7200s(exceeding Namecoin's +2h future-header consensus bound to prove the block was accepted after fencing), and conservatively treat all pre-fencing uncertain reservations as consumed.
7. Security Considerations
- No cross-executor quota sharing: Two independent executors MUST NEVER spend from one apparent grant quota; split budgets across separate concrete-executor grants or parent row groups verified under R8.5.
- Closure write failure: If writing a newly observed
SEAL_SPENTclosure to the journal fails, the verifier MUST refuse admission and halt further admission for that seal until durable storage recovers. - **
window_onlycontainment:** Executors opting into rootwindow_onlyMUST enforce low per-grant and global operator ceilings so a compromisedgrantkey's damage is bounded even before an emergency name update propagates.
8. References
- Normative: [RFC8785], [BIP-340], [BIP-141], [JSON-SCHEMA-2020-12].
- Informative: [RFC8448].