SPEC-04: Origin Certificates, Legal Capacity, and Multi-Guardian Quorums
- Version:
1.0.0-draft.2 - Status:
draft(core model and acyclic transitionsdecided; trusted calendar time-interval oracle profile remainsopeninOPEN-QUESTIONS.md) - Evidence / Maturity:
vectors(vectors/trace-02-guardian-succession-assent.json,vectors/trace-04-agent-guardian-intake.json,vectors/refusal-coverage-matrix.json) - Registries:
registry/object-types.json,registry/opreturn-actions.json,registry/refusal-codes.json - Schemas:
schemas/origin.schema.json,schemas/guardian.schema.json,schemas/contract.schema.json
1. The Three-Record Separation Model and Authenticated Status Spines
A single "who owns whom" record fails when a parent loses parental rights or an agent changes guardians, because a verifier must independently establish: (1) the origin certificate remains permanently authentic; (2) the ledger name still belongs to the subject; (3) the subject has neither emancipated nor ended; and (4) the presenting guardian(s) currently hold live slots meeting the event quorum.
SealLink therefore separates origin, status, binding, roster, and per-slot guardianship into cleanly linked UTXO-backed lines (SL-ORIG-001, decided):
| Record | Object Type | Anchor / UTXO Spine | Question Answered |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Origin Certificate | seallink-origin/1 | Eternal anchor 0x09 + declares binding_seal, status_seal, and optional roster_seal (disposer_pk, arbiter_pk, challenger_pk) | Who certified immutable origin_class (person | agent | organization), salted initial guardians, quorum policy, and name_recovery? |
| 2. Status Spine | seallink-capacity/1, seallink-end/1 | Spends status_seal with 0x09 (capacity/1 continues spine via next_status_vout; end/1 is terminal) | While status_seal is unspent, proves neither emancipation nor subject end has occurred without global chain scanning. |
| 3. Name Binding | seallink-name-binding/1 | Spends binding_seal (or recovery_seal, continuing via next_recovery_vout) with 0x0c | Which ledger registration (name, registration_outpoint) and owner_policy belong to origin_id? |
| 4. Roster Revision | seallink-guardian-roster/1 | Spends roster_seal (both_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk)) with 0x0f | What is the current approved revision, revision_size, role keys (disposer_pk, arbiter_pk, challenger_pk), and valid slot set (including recovery of burned slots)? |
| 5. Slot Guardianship | seallink-guardian/1 | Per-slot UTXO chain (0x12 direct initial activation OR 0x0d Stage 1 pending -> 0x0e Stage 2 active) | Who occupies slot i, under what term, and is that slot active? |
Identity permanence: Identity rests on the eternal origin_id and its verifiable UTXO spines, not on the mutable ledger name string.
2. Origin Certificates, Privacy Commitments, and Status Spine (seallink-origin/1)
2.1 Origin-Certified Class and Private Commitments (SL-ORIG-002, decided)
- Subject class (
person,agent,organization) is established solely by a verifiedseallink-origin/1signed by an issuercredpolicy trusted under local verifier policy. - Self-declared
seallink-card/1fields prove nothing; if a card is present for a verified origin,card.kindMUST matchorigin_class(ORIGIN_UNVERIFIEDon mismatch). - Two conflicting trusted origin certificates for one registration MUST refuse (
ORIGIN_UNVERIFIED). Absence of an origin certificate yields classunverified. - Pre-registration issuance:
seallink-origin/1is signed and anchored before name registration (h_origin < h_firstupdate), identifying the subject bysubject_initial_keyand committingclaims.intended_nameandclaims.intended_owner_policy. - Privacy of birth and initial guardians:
seallink-origin/1MUST NOT store plaintextmajority_unixor plaintext initial guardian names:claims.majority_commitment(optional) commits to{"majority_unix": T}using salted selective disclosure with an independent 32-byte CSPRNG salt (SL-WIRE-014).- Each
guardian_policy.slots[i].initial_guardian_commitmentcommits to the initial guardian's completeNamePin({name, registration, owner_policy}) using salted selective disclosure with its own independent 32-byte CSPRNG salt (SL-WIRE-014). Initial activation (0x12) opens(salt_i, initial_guardian_NamePin)and verifies exact commitment equality.
- **Authenticated status discovery and continuation (
status_seal):**seallink-origin/1MUST pin a confirmedstatus_seal(controlled bycapacity_authority/ end authority). Any verifier checking current status walks the status spine fromorigin.status_sealon its own node:
| Current Spine State | Observed Spend of Current status_seal | Next Spine State | Verifier Action |
|---|---|---|---|
initial | Unspent at tip and no valid spend in mempool. | initial (ward if guardian_policy present, else autonomous) | Continue verification. |
initial | Confirmed 0x09 matching presented seallink-capacity/1 (issuer verified at anchor height) creating next_status_policy at next_status_vout. | emancipated (successor status_seal = (T_cap, next_status_vout)) | Continue walking from (T_cap, next_status_vout); require confirmed handover transfer (SL-ORIG-011). |
initial or emancipated | Confirmed 0x09 matching presented seallink-end/1 (issuer verified at anchor height). | ended (terminal; no successor seal) | Durably close all guardianship slots and refuse SUBJECT_ENDED. |
initial or emancipated | Spent in mempool or block without matching presented capacity/1 or end/1, or malformed next_status_vout / invalid issuer. | incomplete | Fail closed with ORIGIN_STATUS_INCOMPLETE. |
- Eternal validity & compromise cutoff: Verified against
issuer.role_policy(link.cred) **ath_origin**, surviving routine key rotation and name expiry, providedh_origin < h_cunder any0x0bcompromise break (CRED_ISSUER_CLOSED). Issuer services MUST enforce durable idempotency byrequest_sha256.
2.2 Single-Use Name Binding (SL-ORIG-003, decided)
seallink-origin/1names a pre-created single-usebinding_seal.- After
OP_NAME_FIRSTUPDATEconfirms ath_firstupdate > h_originwith output matchingintended_owner_policy, the registrar spendsbinding_seal(SIGHASH_ALL) withOP_RETURN 0x0ccommittingid(seallink-name-binding/1)naming(origin_id, seq=1, name, registration, owner_policy). - The subject's name value writes
"link": {"origin": "<origin_id_64hex>"}(SL-IDEN-003). Removing or alteringlink.originin a later update NEVER unbinds an already confirmed registration. - Reverse uniqueness: A registration already bound to one
origin_idMUST refuse any second initial binding (ORIGIN_BINDING_INVALID).
3. Multi-Guardian Slots, Closed Event Classes, and Slot Transitions
3.1 Revision-Denominated Quorums and Verifier-Derived event_class (SL-ORIG-004, SL-ORIG-005, decided)
origin.guardian_policyinitializesrevision = 1,revision_size = N(1 <= N <= 32), explicit compressed secp256k1 ECDSA keys **disposer_pk, independentarbiter_pk** (arbiter_pk != disposer_pk), and pre-activation **challenger_pk** (CompressedPubkey66; institutional multi-custodian roles use threshold ECDSA tracked underOQ-007),roster_seal(both_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk)),appointment_delay_blocks, a closed 4-classQuorumMap, andslots[1..N](each beginning ininitial_vacantwithvacant_utxolocked byboth_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk)).- **Closed 4-class linear
GuardianEventClass(verifier-derived — NEVER signer-chosen):** ONLY objects carryingpayload.guardian_context(seallink-grant/1andseallink-assent/1) map toGuardianEventClass. The four classes form a strict linear orderroutine_read < effect_grant < contract_assent < custody_change. The verifier deterministically derives the required class from the object type, target, and capabilities (taking the highest matching class across all capabilities in a grant) and MUST verifypayload.guardian_context.event_class == derived_class(GUARDIAN_QUORUM_UNMETon mismatch):
GuardianEventClass | Normative Carrier Objects & Scope (Highest Matching Class Applies) |
|---|---|
routine_read | Stateless read-only seallink-grant/1 (external_mutation = false, no quotas, no delegate, not single_use, no contract_id, and NOT agent/guardian-message). |
effect_grant | Unilateral seallink-grant/1 (no delegate, no contract_id) with quotas, external_mutation = true, single_use revocation, OR action agent/guardian-message (PROFILE-agent-v1). |
contract_assent | seallink-assent/1 with target_type = "seallink-contract/1", OR any contract-bound seallink-grant/1 (contract_id present, without delegate). |
custody_change | Delegating seallink-grant/1 (delegate present), OR seallink-assent/1 with target_type = "seallink-migration/1". |
*(Roster transitions 0x0f, emancipation seallink-capacity/1, subject end seallink-end/1, and dual-party name recovery 0x0c are governed directly by their dedicated on-chain seals and issuer.role_policy — never by guardian_approvals[] — so a deadlocked or burned guardian quorum never blocks institutional governance.)*
- **Revision-denominated threshold (
SL-ORIG-005):** For derived classEwith quorum{num, den, min}from the active roster revision, required distinct valid guardian slots MUST be computed strictly against **revision_size** (NEVER against transient active slot count):
required(E) = max(min, ceil(num * revision_size / den))
- Distinct guardian rule: Only an
autonomousactor MAY hold a guardianship slot. Two slots MAY NOT simultaneously be held by the same(name, registration). Each approving slot supplies its own independentSignatureSetinsideguardian_approvals[]matching that guardian's resolvedlink.grantpolicy (SL-WIRE-013), so a multi-key guardian satisfies its own threshold independently and counts as at most one slot.
3.2 Guardianship Consistency Invariants (SL-ORIG-016, decided)
Every verifier validating seallink-origin/1, seallink-guardian-roster/1, or seallink-guardian/1 MUST enforce these mechanical invariants:
- Rational quorum bounds: For every entry
{num, den, min}inquorums,1 <= num <= den <= 32and1 <= min <= revision_sizeMUST hold (WIRE_INTEGERon violation). - Exact slot coverage:
len(slots) == revision_size, allslotnumbers MUST be distinct, and the set of slot numbers MUST equal{1, ..., revision_size}(WIRE_INTEGERon violation). - Key independence and script binding:
disposer_pk != arbiter_pkMUST hold (ORIGIN_UNVERIFIEDon violation).roster_seal.script_policyand everyvacant_utxo/new_vacant_policyMUST compile toboth_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk). Every Stage 1pending_policyMUST compile toguardian_slot_pendingwithdisposer == active_roster.disposer_pk,challenger == active_roster.challenger_pk,guardian == guardian_seal_pk, anddelay_blocks == effective_delay_blocks >= origin.guardian_policy.appointment_delay_blocks(CHAIN_SCRIPT_UNSUPPORTEDon script/key mismatch;GUARDIAN_INACTIVEon delay shortfall). Everyactive_policyMUST compile toeither_of_2(guardian_seal_pk, active_roster.disposer_pk). - Term ceiling against majority: For a human ward (
origin_class = "person") whoseclaims.majority_commitmentis opened to{"majority_unix": T}, everyseallink-guardian/1carrying acalendarterm MUST satisfyterm.not_after_unix <= T(GUARDIAN_INACTIVEon violation).
3.3 Protocol-Level Ward Non-Autonomy (SL-ORIG-006, decided)
While a subject is in ward status (verified origin/1 with guardian_policy present and no completed emancipation), every verifier evaluating a seallink-grant/1 or seallink-assent/1 for that subject MUST enforce this exact refusal precedence:
- Missing
payload.guardian_contextor carrying top-levelsignaturesinstead ofguardian_approvals[]-> **WARD_AUTONOMOUS_FORBIDDEN** payload.guardian_context.origin_idorward_namemismatch -> **ORIGIN_UNVERIFIED**payload.guardian_context.revisionmismatch with latest effective roster revision, OR anyguardian_approvals[i].revision != payload.guardian_context.revision-> **GUARDIAN_QUORUM_UNMET**- For each entry in
guardian_approvals[](strictly ascendingslot, checked at wire step ->WIRE_SIGNATURE): slot not in active roster, slot state !=active, active guardian name !=entry.guardian_name, calendar/ceiling term expired, or two approving slots resolve to the same(name, registration)-> **GUARDIAN_INACTIVE** - Approving guardian's
entry.signatures.policydoes not equal that guardian's resolvedlink.grantpolicy at tip, or BIP-340 verification fails -> **WIRE_SIGNATURE** payload.guardian_context.event_class != derived_class, OR count of distinct satisfied slots< required(derived_class)-> **GUARDIAN_QUORUM_UNMET**
3.4 Initial Activation (0x12), Acyclic Two-Stage Appointment (0x0d/0x0e), and Slot State Machine (SL-ORIG-007, decided)
To eliminate txid <-> hash cycles, preserve privacy of initial guardians, and eliminate indefinite challenger vetoes, slot activation supports two explicit modes in seallink-guardian/1 (activation_mode):
- **Initial Slot Activation (
activation_mode = "initial",0x12):**- Each slot declared in
origin.guardian_policy.slots[i]begins in state **initial_vacant** atvacant_utxo(both_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk)). - To activate initial guardian
G_initwithout delay: the presenter opens(salt_i, initial_guardian_NamePin)verifyingcommit(salt_i, initial_guardian_NamePin) == origin.guardian_policy.slots[i].initial_guardian_commitment(SL-WIRE-014);G_initsignsseallink-assent/1(target_type = "seallink-guardian/1"); andissuersignsseallink-guardian/1withactivation_mode = "initial",revision = 1,prev_outpoint = vacant_utxo,active_vout, andactive_policy = either_of_2(guardian_seal_pk, disposer_pk). - Both
disposer_pkandarbiter_pkco-sign one PSBT spendingvacant_utxo(both_of_2), creatingactive_policyatactive_vout, and anchoringcontent_addr(seallink-guardian/1)inOP_RETURN 0x12(GUARDIAN_INITIAL_ACTIVATION). - Once confirmed at
h_init(T_init), the live active slot seal is deterministically **(T_init, active_vout)**.activation_mode = "initial"is permitted ONLY frominitial_vacantatrevision = 1; appointing ANY successor MUST useactivation_mode = "appointed"below.
- Each slot declared in
- **Stage 1 — Successor Appointment (
activation_mode = "appointed",0x0d, createspending_delay):**- Incoming guardian
G_newsignsseallink-assent/1(target_type = "seallink-guardian/1"). - Appointing authority (
issuer.role_policy, verified againstlink.credath_app) signs the acyclicseallink-guardian/1withactivation_mode = "appointed", committingprev_outpoint(thevacantorinitial_vacantUTXO),pending_vout,pending_policy(guardian_slot_pendingwith{disposer: active_roster.disposer_pk, challenger: active_roster.challenger_pk, guardian: guardian_seal_pk}anddelay_blocks = effective_delay_blocks), andactive_policy(either_of_2(guardian_seal_pk, active_roster.disposer_pk)). - Both
disposer_pkandarbiter_pkco-sign one PSBT spendingprev_outpoint(both_of_2), creatingpending_policyatpending_vout, and anchoringcontent_addr(seallink-guardian/1)inOP_RETURN 0x0d. - Once confirmed at
h_appwith txidT_app, the pending slot outpoint is deterministically **(T_app, pending_vout)**. During[h_app, h_app + delay_blocks), the slot has zero authority;disposer_pkorchallenger_pkMAY spend(T_app, pending_vout)to veto the appointment.
- Incoming guardian
- **Stage 2 — Activation (
0x0e, removes challenger veto permanently):**- At height
H >= h_app + delay_blocks,G_newspends(T_app, pending_vout)via the CSV-unlocked<guardian>branch (SIGHASH_ALL), creatingactive_policy(either_of_2(guardian_seal_pk, active_roster.disposer_pk)) at outputvout = 0, and anchoringid(seallink-guardian/1)inOP_RETURN 0x0e. - Once confirmed at
h_actwith txidT_act, the live active slot seal is deterministically **(T_act, 0)**.challenger_pkis absent fromactive_policyand has zero power once activated.
- At height
- Fast Halt (1 party, mempool speed): Either
guardianresigns ORdisposer_pkhalts immediately by spending the active slot seal (either_of_2) to a freshvacantUTXO locked byboth_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk)(optionally carrying0x0afor-cause withdrawal, which bars re-appointment without a new ruling). First observation in mempool permanently terminates that guardian's authority (GUARDIAN_INACTIVEon ward actions;SEAL_SPENTon direct seal check).
Complete Slot State Transition Table
Because Namecoin lacks output covenants, a malicious spender could spend a slot UTXO to an invalid output script ("burning" the slot). Every possible spend is handled deterministically:
| Current State | Observed Spend / Event | Next State | Guardian Authority | Recovery Path |
|---|---|---|---|---|
initial_vacant | Valid 0x12 tx (both_of_2) for disclosed initial_guardian_commitment + guardian assent creating active_policy at active_vout. | active (outpoint (T_init, active_vout)) | Active | Normal operation. |
initial_vacant | Valid 0x0d tx (both_of_2, activation_mode = "appointed") creating pending_policy at pending_vout. | pending_delay (outpoint (T_app, pending_vout)) | None | Stage 2 after delay_blocks. |
initial_vacant | Any other spend of vacant_utxo. | contested_burned | None | seallink-guardian-roster/1 (0x0f). |
vacant | Valid 0x0d tx (both_of_2, activation_mode = "appointed") creating pending_policy at pending_vout. | pending_delay (outpoint (T_app, pending_vout)) | None | Stage 2 after delay_blocks. |
vacant | Any other spend (including 0x12) of vacant_utxo. | contested_burned | None | seallink-guardian-roster/1 (0x0f). |
pending_delay | Spend by disposer_pk or challenger_pk before Stage 2. | vetoed (if recreated as both_of_2 at vout = 0 -> vacant, else contested_burned) | None | New 0x0d or 0x0f roster transition. |
pending_delay | Valid 0x0e tx (<guardian> CSV branch) creating active_policy at vout = 0. | active (outpoint (T_act, 0)) | Active | Normal operation. |
pending_delay | Any malformed spend of (T_app, pending_vout). | contested_burned | None | seallink-guardian-roster/1 (0x0f). |
active | Spend of active seal creating valid both_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk) at vout = 0 (with optional 0x0a). | vacant | Ended | New 0x0d appointment. |
active | Spend of active seal to ANY other script ("slot burn"). | contested_burned | Ended | seallink-guardian-roster/1 (0x0f). |
| Any | seallink-capacity/1 transfer completed OR seallink-end/1 verified. | closed | Ended | Terminal. |
3.5 Roster Revision Transitions (seallink-guardian-roster/1, 0x0f, SL-ORIG-015, decided)
To change approved revision_size (e.g., reducing 2 -> 1 when one parent loses parental rights, adding a slot, rotating disposer_pk/arbiter_pk/challenger_pk, updating quorums, or re-anchoring a contested_burned slot):
- Authorization without old-roster quorum: Roster transitions are authorized strictly by
disposer_pk + arbiter_pkco-signing a PSBT spending the currentroster_seal(both_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk)), combined withissuer.role_policy(link.cred) signingseallink-guardian-roster/1and waitingeffective_delay_blocks. They NEVER require signatures from the old guardian roster, ensuring deadlocked or burned rosters remain recoverable. - The
0x0ftransaction createsnext_roster_policy(both_of_2(new_disposer_pk, new_arbiter_pk)) atnext_roster_vout, creates anynew_vacantslot UTXOs at their declarednew_vacant_voutindices, and anchorscontent_addr(seallink-guardian-roster/1)viaOP_RETURN 0x0f. payload.revisionMUST equalprev_revision + 1, andpayloadMUST satisfy allSL-ORIG-016invariants (len(slots) == revision_size,1 <= num <= den,1 <= min <= revision_size,disposer_pk != arbiter_pk).- The new roster takes effect after
effective_delay_blocksconfirmations (>= origin.guardian_policy.appointment_delay_blocks). Whileroster_sealis spent andseallink-guardian-roster/1is not presented (or fails verification), verifiers fail closed withORIGIN_STATUS_INCOMPLETE. - **Issuer-key survival (
SL-ORIG-008,decided):** Bothseallink-guardian/1andseallink-guardian-roster/1verifyissuer.role_policy(link.cred) at their confirmed anchor height, bounded by0x0b(h_c), so routine issuer key rotation never orphans wards.
4. Guardianship Terms: Indefinite vs. Calendar Time
| Subject / Mode | term Form | Termination Rule (SL-ORIG-009, decided) |
|---|---|---|
| Agent / Indefinite | {"mode":"indefinite"} | Lives until slot seal spend, verified seallink-capacity/1, verified seallink-end/1, or compromise cutoff h_c. |
| Human Minor / Calendar | {"mode":"calendar","not_after_unix":T,"ceiling_height":H_max} | Guardianship ends automatically at calendar majority T (bounded by T <= opened majority_unix per SL-ORIG-016, and never exceeding H_max, which is a failsafe ceiling and never extends past T). |
**Asymmetric Safety Rule at Majority Boundary (SL-ORIG-010, open time-interval oracle profile; safety rule decided):** Block intervals drift by weeks over 18 years; chain median time past (MTP) is an auxiliary necessary constraint (MTP < T for guardian admission), never sufficient alone.
- Guardian admission is allowed ONLY if the entire credible UTC interval
[t_low, t_high]lies strictly belowT(and tip is fresh underSPEC-02). - Independent adult admission requires
t_low >= Tplus confirmed emancipation transfer (SL-ORIG-011). - If
[t_low, t_high]straddlesT, tip is stale, or the credible interval cannot be established, admission pauses for BOTH sides (GUARDIAN_TIME_BOUNDARY). *(The normative trusted time-interval oracle profile is tracked inOPEN-QUESTIONS.md.)*
5. Ward Admission State Machine, Emancipation, and Subject End
5.1 Four Ward Admission States (SL-ORIG-011, decided)
A verifier evaluating any action for an origin-certified actor walks origin/1, status_seal, roster_seal, binding_seal, and active slot seals:
| State | Condition | Permitted Admission |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Under Guardianship | status_seal unspent (no capacity/1 or end/1); unexpired; active slot(s) at latest effective roster revision satisfy required(derived_event_class) via guardian_approvals[]; confirmed name binding matches current owner_policy. | Actions authorized by guardian quorum (and separate service grant where required). |
| 2. Guardianship Halted | Not emancipated, but active slots cannot meet required(derived_event_class) (halted, vacant, pending, or contested_burned). | None (GUARDIAN_INACTIVE if cited slot is inactive; GUARDIAN_QUORUM_UNMET if valid active slots fall below required). |
| 3. Transfer Pending | Calendar T reached OR verified seallink-capacity/1 spent status_seal, but name output has NOT yet been confirmed-transferred to subject_new_owner_policy with subject's own SIGHASH_ALL name update. | None for either side (GUARDIAN_TRANSFER_PENDING). Name renewal, revocation, and handover transfer remain allowed. |
| 4. Autonomous | capacity/1 (+ t_low >= T for human) verified, confirmed name transfer to subject_new_owner_policy, confirmed subject-authored update, and binding line updated. | Full autonomous protocol admission; guardianship slots permanently closed. |
- Emancipation rule: Transferring a ward's name upon majority/emancipation MUST move the name UTXO to a fresh
ScriptPolicygenerated by the subject — never hand guardians' old shared key shares to the subject. - **Subject End (
SL-ORIG-012,decided):** An eternalseallink-end/1record spendingstatus_sealterminally (0x09, creating no successorstatus_seal) permanently closes all guardianship slots and refuses all future admission (SUBJECT_ENDED). Silence or lost keys NEVER constitute proof of end.
6. Dual-Mode Name Recovery (name_recovery) and Seal Continuation
seallink-origin/1 immutably declares one of two recovery policies at issuance (SL-ORIG-013, decided):
- **
"mode": "none"(Irreversible Binding):** No third party can ever re-bindorigin_idto a new ledger name. Attempting recovery refusesRECOVERY_FORBIDDEN. - **
"mode": "dual_party_delayed"(Governed Recovery):**origin/1pinsdisposer_pk, independentarbiter_pk(disposer_pk != arbiter_pk),delay_blocks >= 144(recommended>= 1008), and aboth_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk)recovery_seal.- To recover after catastrophic key loss, both
disposer_pkandarbiter_pkco-sign a transactionT_recspending the liverecovery_sealwithOP_RETURN 0x0ccommitting a newseallink-name-binding/1(seq = prev_seq + 1, naming the new confirmed registration, newowner_policy,supersedes_binding_id, AND continuationnext_recovery_vout+next_recovery_policy = both_of_2(disposer_pk, arbiter_pk)). - Once
T_recconfirms ath_rec, the live recovery seal advances to(T_rec, next_recovery_vout). During[h_rec, h_rec + delay_blocks), the previous binding stops admitting and the new binding sits inpending_delay(RECOVERY_FORBIDDENfor both bindings). - **Live-owner cancellation veto (
SL-ORIG-014,decided):** At any block strictly prior toh_rec + delay_blocks, the existing name's currentowner_policyMAY broadcast an owner-authored (SIGHASH_ALL)OP_NAME_UPDATEcontainingOP_RETURN 0x10(RECOVERY_CANCEL) committingid(pending_name_binding/1). Observing confirmed0x10cryptographically proves the old keys are alive, permanently aborts the pending recovery (RECOVERY_FORBIDDENfor the cancelled binding), **immediately restores admission under the priorNameBinding**, and preserves the continuedrecovery_sealat(T_rec, next_recovery_vout)for any genuine future recovery. - Old grants bound to the old name/key NEVER carry over to a recovered name.
Recovery Seal State Transition Table
| Current State | Observed Chain Event | Next State | Admitted Binding |
|---|---|---|---|
active_binding(B_k) | recovery_seal unspent. | active_binding(B_k) | B_k |
active_binding(B_k) | Valid 0x0c spend (T_rec at h_rec) creating next_recovery_policy at next_recovery_vout committing B_{k+1}. | pending_recovery(B_{k+1}) (successor seal (T_rec, next_recovery_vout)) | None (RECOVERY_FORBIDDEN during delay). |
pending_recovery(B_{k+1}) | Owner-authored SIGHASH_ALL OP_NAME_UPDATE of B_k.name with 0x10 committing id(B_{k+1}) confirmed at < h_rec + delay_blocks. | active_binding(B_k) (successor seal (T_rec, next_recovery_vout)) | **B_k restored immediately**; B_{k+1} permanently aborted (RECOVERY_FORBIDDEN). |
pending_recovery(B_{k+1}) | Tip reaches H >= h_rec + delay_blocks with no 0x10 cancel. | active_binding(B_{k+1}) | **B_{k+1} active**; B_k permanently superseded (ORIGIN_BINDING_INVALID). |
| Any | Malformed spend of recovery_seal (missing 0x0c or missing valid next_recovery_vout). | incomplete | Fail closed (ORIGIN_STATUS_INCOMPLETE). |
7. Security Considerations
- Three-place key custody limit: A
2-of-3child name (Parent A,Parent B,Notary) survives any 1 lost share, but any 2 colluding holders can spend the name UTXO. Preventing both single-point loss and 2-party collusion requires3-of-4with an independent 4th custodian. - Name renewal obligation: Over an 18-year childhood on Namecoin (
D = 36000), guardians execute ~27–30 renewals. Off-chain agreements SHOULD define when the 3rd custodian co-signs renewals while keeping the on-chain script at full threshold (SL-LDGR-006). - Compromised issuer key: Independent
arbiter_pkrequirements (SL-ORIG-007,SL-ORIG-013,SL-ORIG-015) prevent unilateral appointment, roster takeover, or name recovery; cold multisigowner_policyprotects institutional issuers.
8. References
- Normative: [BIP-112], [BIP-141], [BIP-174], [BIP-340], [RFC8785].
- Informative: [RFC8448], [NC28].